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A NEW TWIST .IN VOIDING THE ATTACHMENT
OF CORPORATE STOCK
A UNIoUE case has been decided in Delaware' which should serve as
a warning to all states which have neither section 13 of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act2 nor a statutory provision preventing mergers at
least to the extent of stockholders' shares which have been validly at-
tached.' In Union Chemical & Materials Corporation v. Cannon, the
plaintiffs had instituted a stockholders' derivative suit against certain
defendant shareholders on behalf of Union Chemical & Materials, a
Delaware corporation. Jurisdiction was obtained over the defendants
when their shares of Union stock, the certificates of which were all lo-
cated outside Delaware,' were validly seized under the Delaware
sequestration statute.' Shortly thereafter, Union merged, under the pro-
visions of the Delaware merger statutes,' with Vulcan Materials Com-
pany, a New Jersey corporation.
When the defendants subsequently moved for dismissal, the Court
of Chancery denied the plea, holding that the merger had not deprived
Delaware of jurisdiction.7 The Supreme Court of Delaware unani-
mously reversed on the grounds that the lower Delaware court had
never obtained personal jurisdiction and that since the seized shares
were those of a now nonexistent corporation, no property of the de-
fendants remained over which the power of the court could be
exercised.8
Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. Cannon, 148 A.2d 348 (Del. x959).
See note 23 infra.
'Jurisdictions in this unenviable position which also do not allow seizure by means
other than attachment of shares are: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma. New Hampshire would also be in this position, but its merger statute pro-
vides that, "[T]he corporations whose charters are so repealed shall continue as bodies
corporate for the term of three years for the purpose of concluding such consolidation
or merger and of closing and settling their concerns and for no other purpose, but
subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court to revive such corporations if justice
so requires for special purposes." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294-4z (1955). This
language may be broad enough to prevent the attached shares from being converted.
'DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1953).
'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §.366 (1953).
a DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 252 (1953).
'Cannon v. Union Chem. & Materials Corp., - Del. -, 144 A.2d 142 (Del. Ch.
1958).8 Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. Cannon, supra note x, at 352.
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The Chancellor found a basis for the maintenance of jurisdiction
in section 259(a) of the Delaware Code which provides, with regard to
mergers, that all rights of creditors and all liens upon any property of
any of the constituent corporations shall be preserved unimpaired, shall
attach to the surviving corporation, and may be enforced against it.' In
this statutory provision the Chancellor "discovered" a duty on Vulcan
to preserve the seizure." The Supreme Court of Delaware, on the
other hand, construed the statute to limit the surviving corporation's
liability to liens upon any corporate property of the constituent corpora-
tions." Since a corporation is deemed to have no property interest in
the shares of its stockholders,"2 section 259(a) was thus properly de-
dared inapplicable in this case.
Nor was the Delaware sequestration scheme, which voids any trans-
fer or assignment of seized property,1 of assistance to the plaintiffs
here for a merger conventionally is held to cause the conversion4 of
shares rather than their transfer or assignment.
Perhaps the basic thrust of the plaintiffs' argument relied on the
broad principle that jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subse-
quent events. 5 As noted by the Delaware appellate court, however,
this seeming axiom is apparently derived from cases where personal as
well in rem jurisdiction has been gained." Here personal jurisdiction
over the defendants was never acquired by the sequestration of their
shares. The merger, being valid under Delaware statutes, lawfully and
automatically converted the situs of the Union stock. from Delaware to
Vulcan in New Jersey,17 thereby depriving the Delaware court of the
5
"[Bjut all rights of creditois and all liens upon any property of any of said con-
stituent corporations shall be preserved unimpaired, and all debts, liabilities and duties
of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said resulting or
surviving corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said
debts, liabilities and duties-had been incurred or contracted by it." .DEL. CoDE ANN. tit.
8, § 259 (1953).
10 Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. Cannon, supra note , a't 352
' Ibid.
"' Hine, Situs of Shares Issued Under the Uniform Stock Transfer 4ct, 87 U. PA .
L. REV. 700, 704 (x939). See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton,
27o U.S. 69, 81 (1926) (the owner of the shares of stock in a company is not the
owner of the company's property).
'"Any transfer or assignment of the property so seized after the seizure thereof
shall be void .... " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(c) (1955).
" Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. Cannon, supra note x, at 352.
'21z C.J.S; Courts § 93 (955).
, Union. Chem, & .Materials Corp.. v. Cannon, supra note i, at 352
reNew Jersey has incorporated section 13 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act into
VOL. 1959: 630 ]
DUKE .1AW JOURNAWL
r,sby which it claimed jurisdictional power' and through which, sub-
sequently, it could enforce a money judgment.'"
Arguably, of course, the conversion inured to the benefit of the
Delaware sequestrator upon a theory that under Delaware law, 0 at
least, he held the equitable interest in the Union shares at the time of
the merger. This was, perhaps, the essence of the Chancellor's holding.
The trouble with this view, regardless of whatever theoretical and logi-
cal,validity it may have, is that it fails to anticipate the legal and prac-
tical difficulties which would attend its applicaton. For instance, even if
Delaware were willing to claim jurisdiction on such a basis, give the
plaintiffs a money judgment on the merits, and order a sale of the
Union shares, such a judgment or order would eventually have to be
enforced through Vulcan in New Jersey, at least so long as Delaware's
jurisdiction over surviving corporations is statutorily limited to matters
involving corporate property. In a New Jersey enforcement action,
the Delaware judgment or order would almost certainly be met with a
successful collateral attack upon the jurisdictional issue since the state
of incorporation, New Jersey in Vulcan's case, normally is held to ex-
ercise sole jurisdiction over the issuance and transfer of shares of its
corporations.21 Indeed, by the very fact that Delaware allows its cor-
porations to merge with foreign corporations, it may be said to recog-
nize specifically that, with regard to the conversion of shares, the law of
the foreign state is to govern once the merger is complete. Therefore,
it 'would seem that New Jersey could properly refuse to give full faith
aid "credit to the Delaware judgment or order.
No matter how legally correct the decision, it obviously reaches a
bad result. The plainiffs did everything within their power under the
sequestration statutes to obtain jurisdiction,22 only to see it lost through
te subseciuent actions of the defendants. Yet any other decision would
require, as noted, an unwarranted stretching of the statutes or a course
which would prove futile in its ultimate effect. Of course, this particu-
its statutes. Therefore, the situs would be the place where the certificates are located.
Elgart v. Mintz. 124. NJ. Eq. 136, zoo Atl. 49 8(x93.8).
.... .Would the Delaware courts,ha-ve lost jurisdiction if Union had merged with an-'
other Delaware corporation? The same reasoning which was applied in this case to
cause the jurisdiction to be lost.would be applicable in the hypothetical situation. But
.e. Cannon v. Union Chem. & Materials Corp., supra note 7, at 144.'1 9 Supra note 5.
2Ibid.
'z "Shares in a corporation are subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which the
corporation was incorporated." RESTATEmNT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 53() (1934).
*2 utra note. 
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lar case would never arise in those states which have adopted section 13
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which makes the situs of shares, for
attachment purposes, the place where the representative stock certificates
are located.23  In such states attached certificates, being tangible in
nature, could not normally be converted against the interests of the
court so long as the court held them. 24 However, assuming the con-
tinued validity of whatever considerations haveinfluenced a number of
states to reject section 13 and to authorize attachment only through
sequestration of the intangible shares,2" even these states could prevent
the result of the instant case by incorporating within their merger
schemes a clause voiding the conversion of attached shares and retaining
jurisdiction over the surviving corporation to enforce such a law. Such
a provision would permit a merger to the extent of unsequestered shares,
thereby avoiding undue prejudice in those situations where a great ma-
jority of the stock of a corporation is not involved in a lawsuit. If such
a statutory device had existed in the present case, Vulcan, having notice
of the attachment, would have been bound to honor it and would have
had the duty to exchange Vulcan shares for attached Union shares only
when and in the manner directed by the Delaware Court. It was an
enactment of this sort which the Delaware Supreme Court invited its
legislature to adopt in order to prevent the repetition of the undesirable
result reached in the Cannon case.26
Thus, even if it serves no other good purpose, the instant decision
should act as a stimulant to the legislatures of Delaware and other simi-
larly situated states to enact legislation effective to close this loophole
in their attachment proceedings.
" "No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding
shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized by the officer making the attach-
ment or levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by
the holder be enjoined. Except where a certificate is lost or destroyed, such corporation
shall not be compelled to issue a new certificate for the stock until the old certificate is
surrendered to it." UNIFORM STOCK TRAisFEP Acr § 131 6 U.LA. § 13 (x9zz).
See also note 17 supra.
24 32 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 897 (-932).
21 Supra note 3.
2" "The situation, in our opinion, stems from the failure of our merger statutes to
provide, in cases of attachment of stock, for a deferment of the- effective date of the
conversion of any shares held under valid attachment until the attachment shall have
been dissolved or otherwise disposed of, thus preserving the situs of the attached shares
in this state." Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. Cannon, supra note i, at -351.
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